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The International Trade Commission
and Changes to United States Patent
Law
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal protection of ideas is by no means a novel
concept. The history of patent law and intellectual property can
be traced to England’s Statute of Monopolies enacted in 1623.
And the notion that valuable discoveries should be protected by
law has been documented as far back as the fourth century BC
in writings such as Aristotle’s Politics.1 It is debatable as to
where the proper balancing point lies between allowing
inventors to adequately profit from their inventions and
requiring them to share their knowledge with the public.
Evidence has demonstrated, however, a strong correlation
between idea protection and innovation.2 The system of patent
protection in the United States has evolved a great deal since its
initiation, but a number of principles remain at its core. Among
these are the promotion of inventiveness,3 the protection of
property and personhood,4 and the safeguarding of national
industries.5 It is the last of these goals—the topic of this note—
that was of great concern to our country’s leaders when they
first created the International Trade Commission (ITC) and
expanded its powers over international trade and relations.6
The ITC was created in 1974 to help the United States
manage its international trade laws, with one of its chief
1

ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-5 (4th ed. 2007).
2
Id. at 9-10 (citing ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL
PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS 1869-1912; SWITZERLAND 1850-1907 (1971)) (providing
statistical evidence that the reintroduction of a patent system in the Netherlands in
1912 spurred Dutch inventiveness).
3
ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 2-3 (3d ed. 2009).
4
Id.
5
Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 547 (2009).
6
Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 67 (2008).
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priorities being to promote our country’s competitiveness in the
global marketplace.7 Despite its recent creation, the ITC’s concern
for our national industries reflects deep and historic American
sentiments of nationalism that predate the birth of our nation. A
multitude of statutes and protocols have been enacted in this vein
over the course of our country’s existence.8 One of the broadest of
these initiatives was the 1930 Trade Act, which first introduced
intellectual-property measures to assist in the protection of the
U.S. economy, essentially allowing entities to block the
importation of goods if the effect or threat of such importation
would injure American industry.9 Section 337 of the Trade Act
allows parties to address their concerns through administrative
proceedings, specifically targeting improper importation of goods
into the United States, and these powers were placed under the
ITC’s jurisdiction upon its creation.10 Often, complaints brought
before the ITC against importers take the form of intellectual
property disputes—namely, claims of patent infringement or
patent invalidity.11 When Congress granted the ITC jurisdiction to
address these issues, it effectively created—for the first time in
U.S. history—a venue other than the federal courts to litigate
patent disputes.12
The ITC is much more than just a second venue,
however, and section 337 proceedings differ greatly from federalcourt proceedings. One major disparity is that the ITC has in
rem jurisdiction over articles imported into the United States.13
This power allows for charges to be brought against an alleged
infringer even if personal jurisdiction is not available.14
7

About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_
room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (“The mission of the Commission is to (1)
administer U.S. trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective manner; (2)
provide the President, USTR, and Congress with independent analysis, information, and
support on matters of tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness; and (3)
maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS).”).
8
Chien, supra note 6, at 66. Evidence of this sentiment existed as early as
the 1770s, with the seizure of underpriced Indian tea during the Boston Tea Party in
efforts to protect the colonies’ local tea market. Id.
9
Id. at 67.
10
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
11
Kumar, supra note 5, at 544.
12
Douglas P. Martin, Preclusive Effect of Factual Determinations of the
International Trade Commission with Regard to Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885,
885-86 (1995).
13
Russell E. Levine & James B. Coughlan, United States Intellectual
Property Litigation and the ITC, IP VALUE (2004), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/
kirkexp/publications/2433/Document1/Levine%20(Globe%20White%20Page).pdf.
14
Id.
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Additionally, in section 337 proceedings an administrative law
judge—rather than a jury—is the finder of fact, the timeframe
for litigation and trial is limited, and parties are restricted to
suing for injunctive relief.15 Due to the multitude of disparities
between cases brought in the ITC and cases brought in federal
courts, problems have arisen. Specifically, cases brought before
the ITC pursuant to section 337 are diverging from the ITC’s
primary goal of providing protection to American industries.16
Commentators have also raised concerns that these proceedings
may violate international law.17 In addition, studies show that
proceedings before the ITC improperly favor patent holders18 and
promote inefficiencies in the patent system.19 Furthermore,
because the federal courts do not give ITC cases preclusive
effect, judicial resources are wasted.20
This note argues that this alternate patent-dispute forum
is wreaking havoc on the U.S. patent system, and suggests a
possible solution through elimination of ITC patent litigation
and large-scale amendments to patent law. The following
sections address the complex issues presented. First, Part II of
this note provides a short history of patent law in the U.S.
federal courts. Part III discusses the creation of the ITC and its
power to hear patent disputes, and offers an in-depth analysis of
the differences between federal court and ITC proceedings. Next,
Part IV explores the problems created by ITC patent cases and
their effect on U.S. patent law. Finally, Part V offers a solution
to these problems by suggesting the government initiate a
holistic amendment plan. This plan includes eliminating patent
practice before the ITC and adopting suggested changes under
the proposed Patent Pilot Program, creating a more specialized
district-court system to hear patent cases.21 In addition, the
15

Id.
Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement
Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
457, 470 (2008).
17
Robert G. Krupka, International Trade Commission Patent Litigation: A
Unique Experience, in PATENT LITIGATION 1994, at 709, 731 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. G4-3929, 1994).
18
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 490.
19
Chien, supra note 6, at 71.
20
J. Brian Kopp, Note, In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation:
Should ITC Patent Decisions Be Given Preclusive Effect in District Courts?, 24
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 357, 357 (1991).
21
Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent
Pilot Program’s Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR.
B.J. 191, 191 (2009).
16
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solution recommends that the federal courts adopt some of the
beneficial aspects of ITC practices, including in rem jurisdiction
and eased standards by which injunctive relief is awarded.
II.

BACKGROUND OF PATENT LAW IN UNITED STATES
FEDERAL COURTS

In the United States, the founding fathers thought that
intellectual property was important enough to explicitly protect
it in the Constitution, providing that “Congress shall have
Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22
The first U.S. Patent Act was passed in May 1790,23 and the
first patent was issued within months of its passage.24 Cases
involving patent issues were treated no differently than other
federal cases, and could be brought to the district court and
appealed up through the federal court system. It was not until
the 1836 revision of the Patent Act that a formal system of
examination was put into place, setting the stage for the
current system of patent prosecution and examination that we
know today.25 Over the next century and a half, the number of
cases brought before the federal courts grew immensely, and it
was not until the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982 that the next vital change in U.S.
patent law was initiated.26 After this change, all federal courts
were still permitted to hear patent cases, but any appeals
would now be heard by the newly created Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.27 Since this time, no other modifications
have been made to the U.S. federal-court system with respect
to patent-related cases. The U.S. federal courts were, until very
recently, the only venue in which to commence patent cases
22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-112 (1790) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
24
The first patent was issued to Samuel Hopkins of Philadelphia on July 31, 1790,
for the process of making potash from wood ashes. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 8.
25
Id. In the world of patents, the term “prosecution” refers to the application
process through which patents are obtained. Id. at 50.
26
Id. at 11. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in
response to divergent trends being set by various circuits throughout the United
States. Id. By creating a single, unified court of appeals that would handle all appeals
involving patent matters, differences in the law could be unified, and alterations to the
patent doctrine could be established as believed necessary. Id.
27
Id.
23
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and still remain the most prominent arena for the protection of
patents.28
III.

ITC JURISDICTION—AN ALTERNATE VENUE IS CREATED

The formation of the ITC and subsequent congressional
changes to its function have created a unique and appealing
alternate forum for patent litigation. The numerous procedural
distinctions between cases held before the ITC and those before
federal courts provide for a different, and often preferred,
environment for rights holders, leading to an increase in its
popularity in recent years.29
A.

History of the ITC

The ITC was created by Congress as part of the Trade
Act of 1974.30 One of the ITC’s purposes is to provide remedies
for unfair trade practices, and in order to ensure its
effectiveness, Congress granted it expansive jurisdiction and
remedial powers.31 Consequently, the ITC became an alternate
and appealing venue for intellectual property cases, in which
domestic producers may assert their rights to exclude
infringing products from importation into the United States.32
The ITC is responsible for administering a statute called
Unfair Practices in Import Trade,33 commonly referred to as
“section 337.”34 Section 337 was originally created with the
Tariff Act of 1930 but was largely ignored for decades after its
passage.35 The ability to effectively exclude infringing products
was hindered by its requirement that the President be involved
in the process, making it both very cumbersome and

28

Id.
Bryan A. Schwartz, Where the Patent Trials Are: How the U.S.
International Trade Commission Hit the Big Time as a Patent Litigation Forum, 20
INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 1, 1 (2002).
30
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
31
Martin, supra note 12, at 885. This power included the ability to
investigate unfair practices in import trade through all legal and equitable defenses
brought before it. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988).
32
Martin, supra note 12, at 885.
33
19 U.S.C. § 1337.
34
Gilbert B. Kaplan & Courtland Reichman, The ITC or the District Court?—
Where to Protect Your International Intellectual Property, BRIEFLY, Nov. 2006, at v.
35
Krupka, supra note 17, at 709.
29
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inefficient.36 However, Congress remedied this issue by creating
of the ITC, which transferred exclusion power from the
President to the commission in 1974.37
After its creation, section 337 proceedings have been
used to halt the importation of goods that infringe U.S. patents
at an ever-increasing pace.38 In 1988, section 337 was further
amended to increase its effectiveness and availability of use
through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.39 These
amendments effectively eased the burden of establishing a
patent-infringement
violation
by
dropping
several
requirements for patent holders filing complaints.40 These
changes made it cheaper to litigate patent cases before the ITC
and expanded patent holders’ access to the forum. As a result,
the number of patent cases that were brought before the ITC
began to increase.41 The number of cases has climbed from only
nine complaints filed in 1999 to forty complaints in 2008,
representing an increase of over 400% in only ten years.42 This
increase in patent-related cases before the ITC is beginning to
have drastic effects on patent law within the United States,
and the rise in popularity of the venue has shown little, if any,
sign of waning.

36

Id. at 710. The Tariff Commission was empowered to investigate unfaircompetition complaints and make recommendations to the President, who had statutory
authority to increase tariffs or ban products from importation altogether. Id.
37
Id. In addition to the transfer of powers to the ITC, other amendments
were also passed that made the use of section 337 a viable alternative to federal court
cases. These amendments (1) included the provision for faster relief by imposing a
twelve- to- eighteen-month limit on decisions (this requirement was later revoked
through amendments made in 1994), (2) increased the reliability of proceedings by
creating formal-adjudication provisions, and (3) made available patent-invalidity and
unenforceability defenses. Donna M. Tanquay & Audrey M. Sugimura, Patent
Litigation Before the ITC, in PATENT LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 747, 754.
38
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1.
39
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1, 19 U.S.C. § 2901
(1988).
40
Kumar, supra note 5, at 548-49. Prior to the amendments, the Act required
that a patent holder engage in a domestic industry, that the industry was “efficiently
and economically operated,” and that the importation of the goods would substantially
injure the industry. 19 U.S.C. § 337(a) (1987). The 1988 Act eliminated the second and
third requirements for intellectual-property-infringement cases. Kumar, supra note 5,
at 549.
41
Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at v.
42
All section 337 cases before the ITC are available online at http://www.
usitc.gov.
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Distinctions Between Federal Courts and the ITC

The most obvious distinction between decisions
rendered by the ITC and those by U.S. federal courts is that
the ITC is an independent federal agency.43 It is not tied to the
judicial or legislative branches, or to any other department of
the executive branch.44 It is presided over by six commissioners
appointed by the President who each serve nine-year terms.45 In
addition to this evident distinction, further significant
substantive and procedural differences exist in almost every
aspect of a proceeding before the ITC when compared to
federal-court cases.46
1. Required Showing of Domestic Industry
One important difference in ITC hearings is the
requirement to show that a domestic industry exists.47
Specifically, the ITC requires that an industry relating to the
product protected by patent exists or is in the process of being
established in the United States, in addition to the elements
necessary to establish a claim of patent infringement.48 At one
time, the domestic-industry requirement served as a significant
hurdle that plaintiffs had to clear before filing a patent
infringement suit before the ITC,49 barring suit unless the
importation of the goods would destroy, substantially injure, or
prevent the establishment of an industry.50 Now, however, the
requisite standard has been lowered, requiring only that there
be significant investment in a plant and equipment, significant
43

Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 6.
Id.
45
Id.
46
The number of procedural and substantive differences between ITC and
district court proceedings is enormous. Discussion on all of these differences would
exceed the scope of this note, so only those differences that are relevant to the
discussion are addressed. For a complete discussion of all differences, see generally id.
47
John Gladstone Mills III et al., Importation and Exportation of Patented
Goods, in 4 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 21:43 (2d ed. 2009).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. The current requirement as defined under the Tariff Act of 1930 is far
less burdensome than the previous statute. Prior to the amendment, the effect or
tendency of the importation of the goods into the United States had to “destroy or
substantially injure an industry efficiently and economically operated in the United
States,” or “prevent the establishment of such an industry.” Id. This requirement was
eliminated to do away with the need to present and evaluate extensive economic data.
Id.
44
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employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in
the industry’s exploitation.51 With this change, the domesticindustry requirement is far less of an impediment for potential
plaintiffs.52
2. Abbreviated Case Duration
Another significant distinction between proceedings
before the ITC and federal courts is the estimated timeline of
the case.53 At one time, fixed time periods were set for
investigations, allowing both parties to know exactly how long
the case would last, but this requirement was lifted in the 1994
amendments.54 Efficiency is still an important focus of the ITC,
however, and thus a provision was adopted that required cases
be completed “at the earliest practicable time.”55 A survey of
section 337 cases before the ITC between 1999 and 2004
indicated that the average case took approximately thirteen
and a half months.56 This is significantly shorter than the three
to five years a typical patent-infringement case takes when
brought in the federal courts.57 This drastic difference in length
of cases offers huge incentives to plaintiffs both in time and in
estimated expenses, and serves as one of the biggest draws to
ITC proceedings.
3. In Rem Jurisdiction
A major difference between ITC proceedings and
federal-court proceedings is that only the ITC has in rem
jurisdiction over articles imported into the United States.58
Consequently, complainants can bring charges against an
alleged infringer even if personal jurisdiction over the
respondent is not present—an option that is unavailable in
federal court.59 In ITC proceedings, the complainant does not
have to prove that the respondent has a domestic presence or
51

19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2006).
See Mills et al., supra note 47, at 21-177; see also infra Part IV.A.
53
Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 18.
54
Id.
55
Id. To achieve this goal, the commission sets a “target date” by which the
case should be completed, typically twelve to fifteen months. Id.
56
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
57
Id.
58
Levine & Coughlan, supra note 13.
59
Id.
52
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bring suit against the purchasers who are established in the
United States, giving the commission very broad reach.60 In
addition, the ITC provides the opportunity to address
infringement by multiple products and multiple parties in a
single forum.61 In federal-court patent trials, time and expenses
are exhausted litigating jurisdiction and service issues,
especially if overseas companies are involved.62 By giving the
ITC such broad jurisdiction these costs and headaches are
almost entirely eliminated.
4. Employment of Administrative Law Judges and
Better Courtroom Resources
Another considerable difference in proceedings before
the ITC is that an administrative law judge (ALJ) serves as the
finder of fact.63 There is no jury involved and it is up to the ALJ
to both oversee the case and to determine whether section 337
has been violated.64 Once the ALJ makes an initial
determination, the decision may be submitted to the
commission for review.65 This initial determination will become
final unless the commission orders that further review is
required, or a petition is filed by one of the parties involved.66
The decision is then submitted to the President of the United
States for review.67 The President is given a sixty-day period
during which he can disapprove of the commission’s
“Under
these
determination
for
“policy
reasons.”68
circumstances, the determination by the commission will have
no force or effect,” but “disapprovals are rare” and have only
been applied in “limited circumstances.”69
The use of an ALJ, who is often experienced in
overseeing intellectual-property disputes involving complex
technical issues,70 is one of the reasons some complainants
60

Id.
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 2.
62
Id.
63
See Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 24-25.
64
Id. at 25.
65
Id. at 26.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 28. In practice, “policy reasons” have included national security,
national economic interests, and potential impact on U.S. foreign relations. Id.
69
Id. at 29.
70
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6.
61

1102

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

believe that the ITC is a preferable forum. The theory is that
because the ALJs and their clerks hear no other type of cases,
they become well versed and quite adept at dealing with the
intricacies of patent cases.71 Also, the ITC’s Office of Unfair
Import Investigations (OUII), which represents the public’s
interest during the investigations, is comprised primarily of
career attorneys.72 Due to the absence of all other types of cases,
the ALJs and OUII can maintain a singular focus in their
responsibilities, arguably resulting in better decisions.73 In
addition, the ITC is equipped with high-tech capabilities in all
of its courtrooms, and most parties and judges will typically
avail themselves of real-time reporting and sophisticated
graphic presentations.74 In many patent trials, the subject
matter is very technical, making these facilities quite useful
and accommodating. This experience and tenure working with
patent cases would be hard to find in any federal court and
again invites an increasing number of litigants to the ITC.
5. Available Remedies
Finally, the available remedies offered by the ITC are
also unique. In section 337 proceedings, unlike in federal-court
proceedings, monetary damages are unavailable.75 Preliminary
injunctions are permitted but are rarely necessary due to the
speed of the litigation process.76 Alternatively, the commission
generally enters exclusion orders, either in limited fashion
against a named respondent or against all infringing articles
without regard to source.77 The scope of ITC relief is narrower
because it only focuses on the control of the importation of goods
into the United States, but this focus is balanced by the
injunctive powers it can grant, which far exceed those available
in district courts. The ability, through “general” exclusion
orders, to exclude all imported products of a certain type—
regardless of whether the manufacturer was a defendant in the
case—is unparalleled in the courts and hugely enticing to
71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Section 337 Investigations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, USITC
PUB. 4105, at 24 (Mar. 2009), [hereinafter USITC FAQ], http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_
property/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
76
Kumar, supra note 5, at 538.
77
USITC FAQ, supra note 75, at 24.
72
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potential plaintiffs.78 Exclusion orders offer a much more efficient
mechanism for dealing with the importation of infringing
products by stopping goods at the border rather than suing once
the goods enter the marketplace.79 In addition, “the so-called
limited exclusion orders” against named defendants “are not so
limited.”80 These “orders . . . apply prospectively against all of [a
defendant’s] existing or future products of the [same] type,” not
just the models presented at trial.81
Not only is the injunctive relief provided by the ITC
broader than in federal court, but it is also much easier to
obtain.82 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme
Court held that in order to obtain injunctive relief in the
federal courts, a patent holder must pass a four-part analysis.83
Accordingly, a party seeking an injunction in federal court
must demonstrate (1) that it has suffered irreparable injury, (2)
that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the
injury, (3) that a remedy in equity is warranted when
considering the balance of hardships to the plaintiff and
defendant, and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by the injunction.84 The ITC’s standard for injunctive
relief is much lower. The ITC typically issues injunctions
whenever it finds that a product infringes on a claimant’s
patent.85 Notably, before issuing an exclusion order, the ITC
must consider the effect the exclusion order will have on the
“public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly
competitive articles in the United States, and United States
consumers.”86 However, these policy concerns are typically
downplayed and rarely stop orders of exclusion.87
When considering the differences between ITC and
district-court proceedings, it is understandable why some
plaintiffs would choose to bring suit against alleged patent
infringers before the ITC rather than in district courts. Combine
all of the potential benefits with a higher success rate for
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Schwartz, supra note 29, at 5.
Kumar, supra note 5, at 565-66.
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6.
Id.
Kumar, supra note 5, at 566.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Id.
Kumar, supra note 5, at 566.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2000).
Kumar, supra note 5, at 566.
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patentees than in district court, and the reason for the ITC’s
blossoming popularity is clear.88 Patent attorneys and strategists
have made practice before the ITC a very relevant alternative to
bringing suit before a U.S. federal court, and increasing
numbers of experienced attorneys will recommend ITC hearings
over the courts in a variety of situations.89 But just because this
venue is popular does not mean that it is proper, and many of
these differences have had serious and detrimental effects on
patent practice in the United States.
IV.

PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ITC PATENT CASES

With all of the procedural and substantive divergences
of patent law before the ITC, it is easy to understand how the
application of patent law deviates from the federal court’s
precedent. With the increased popularity of practice before the
ITC in recent years, criticism of this alternative venue has also
risen sharply and for just cause.90 Patent practice utilizing
section 337 in cases before the ITC is beginning to have
harmful effects on the state of patent law within the United
States, and the time has come to initiate much needed change
before its effects worsen. In this section, I first address the
concern that practice before the ITC is deviating from section
337’s intended purpose. Second, I discuss whether ITC
practices are violating international law. Third, I explore the
accusations that the ITC improperly favors patent holders.
Finally, I address the possibilities of forum shopping,
conflicting decisions, and judicial waste.

88

A snapshot of cases between 1995 and 2000 shows nearly a seventypercent success rate for the patentee (if settlement numbers are included). Schwartz,
supra note 29, at 7-8.
89
Mark Abate and Charles Sanders of Goodwin Procter LLP have theorized
that the ITC should especially be considered in five specific scenarios: (1) when the
patent owner files suit early in the patent’s product cycle, (2) where personal
jurisdiction is questionable, (3) in response to a declaratory judgment or a patentinfringement action, (4) where the patent claims a method of manufacture, and (5)
when the litigation target makes only a “sale for importation.” Mark J. Abate &
Charles Sanders, Patent Litigation in the ITC, 9 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 3 (2009).
90
See, e.g., Chien, supra note 6; Hahn & Singer, supra note 16; Kumar, supra
note 5.
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ITC Cases Brought Under Section 337 Are Deviating
from the Statute’s Intended Purpose

When the ITC was created in 1974, Congress intended it
to protect domestic industry.91 Previously, the agency served only
as an advisor to the President, but with its expanded powers, it
now has the authority to make final decisions regarding unfair
trade practices and to issue exclusion orders.92 Upon granting the
ITC these powers, intellectual-property claims brought against
foreign companies began to be filed.93 By the early 1980s,
however, advocates motivated by an increased need for
protection of domestic industry were building momentum to
make amendments to the 1974 Trade Act.94 Congress found that
unfair trade practices were “cumbersome and costly,” and that
existing laws did not provide U.S. patent holders with adequate
protection against foreign companies.95 Thus, Congress passed
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which
expanded the scope of section 337 to make patent-infringement
claims against foreign companies easier by lowering the
requirements for bringing suit.96 With Congress recognizing the
importance of protecting our national industries, it is easy to
understand why they granted such broad powers to the ITC.
However, Congress failed to specify a necessary limit to the
scope of these powers, which has allowed claimants to file a
broad range of actions pursuant to section 337 that deviate from
the ITC’s fundamental goals.
The ITC forum is not limited to particular parties
dependent upon nationality, and complaints are no longer
confined to cases that protect domestic industries from unfair
competitors, even though this was the purpose behind the
commission’s creation.97 The only jurisdictional prerequisites are
that the defendant import goods and that the complainant
satisfy the domestic-industry requirement of section 337(a)(2).98
To be a domestic industry, a company need only show that it has
91

Kumar, supra note 5, at 544. The ITC was created through the Trade Act

of 1974. Id.
92

Id.
Id. at 546.
94
Id. at 545.
95
Id. (quoting the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107).
96
Id. at 548-49.
97
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469.
98
Id.
93
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a “significant investment in plant and equipment; significant
employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in its
exploitation, including engineering, research and development,
or licensing” in the United States.99 Also, since there is no bar
against bringing suit against industries or companies based in
the United States, many of the cases brought before the ITC are
actually against domestic manufacturers or suppliers.100 In fact,
many cases involve only foreign companies or are cases brought
by foreign companies against domestic companies.101 As long as
any component or article is imported into the United States, the
ITC will hear the case. These scenarios are a far cry from the
ITC’s initial motives to ensure the protection of U.S. industry,
and this trend is not fading. Cases involving domestic
complainants against a foreign respondent have steadily
declined since the ITC was formed.102 In the 1980s, domesticversus-foreign cases accounted for 83% of all section 337 patent
cases; in the 1990s, these cases accounted for 74% of all cases;
and from 2000 to 2006, they accounted for 66% of all cases.103
This movement away from domestic-versus-foreign cases
suggests that the ITC is deviating from its original goal of
protecting U.S. industry from foreign competitors. Steps need to
be taken to amend this state of affairs.
B.

Potential Violations of International Law

The motivation behind the ITC’s abandoning of its
protectionist roots lies primarily in the development of
international law and the United States’ need to look beyond
our borders when making decisions regarding our nation’s
industries. As the interdependence of the world’s nations grew,
and treaties were signed and agreements were made, the
single-sided and now-antiquated concern with national
interests fell by the wayside. The original purpose of section
337—to give advantages to national industry at the expense of
foreign competition—is not only frowned upon in today’s
99

19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2000).
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469. See, e.g., In re Certain Baseband Processor
Chips & Chipsets (Broadcom v. Qualcomm), Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 21, 2005).
101
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469. Four cases in 2001 were brought by a
foreign company against another foreign company. See, e.g., In re Certain Portable Digital
Media Players, Inv. No. 337-TA-573, (June 14, 2006); In re Certain Video Cassette Devices,
Inv. No. 337-TA-464, (Sept. 14, 2001); see also Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 470.
102
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 470.
103
Id.
100
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globalized world, but these actions also violate international
protocols.104 In 1988, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) panel ruled that some aspects of section 337 violated
international law.105 Specifically, the report alleged that foreign
respondents were being discriminated against due to the strict
time limits that were believed to benefit local residents, the
inability of foreign respondents to assert counterclaims, the
potential for dual path litigation, the complainant’s choice of
forum options, and the use of broad general exclusion orders.106
To address these concerns, Congress amended section
337 in 1995 in a number of ways.107 The amendments removed
the strict statutory time limit of twelve or eighteen months,
allowing adequate preparation time for foreign companies.108
Congress also heightened the requirements for awarding
general exclusion orders to limit the ease of award.109 Finally,
the amendments permitted defendants to file counterclaims to
even the playing field.110 Although these changes are seemingly
justified, they were the initial steps leading to the current state
of controversial patent-law practices in the ITC. It was the
congressional attempt to bring a purposefully prejudicial
statutory effort in line with international obligations that has
led to the middle-ground, compromised solution we now have in
place. Assuming the amendments made to the statute were
effective, there are in essence two possible outcomes: (1) an
effective but now illegal protection of domestic companies at
the expense of foreign competitors as originally proscribed by
section 337, or (2) an ineffective and much-diluted effort that is
legal but in no way provides U.S. companies with the
protection section 337 was created to offer. The current state of
the law leaves us squarely in the latter of these options and is
strong evidence of the need for change.

104

Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the
GATT and the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 459, 475-77 (2002).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 476.
107
Ralph A. Mittelberger & Gary M. Hnath, Changes in Section 337 as a
Result of the GATT-Implementing Legislation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 465, 479 (1994).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 486.
110
Id. at 480-81. But these counterclaims are automatically removed to a U.S.
district court. Id.
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ITC Practice Improperly Favors Patent Holders

Critics have raised and debated a further issue with
current patent practice before the ITC—here, in relation to the
results of the proceeding. For years, critics have argued that
the ITC forum improperly favors patent holders, but little
empirical evidence was offered in support of these claims. In
2008, however, Robert Hahn and Hal Singer published the
results of a study they performed, finally offering firm
statistical support to these claims.111
One of the metrics Hahn and Singer focused on was
relative percentages of cases finding patent infringement in the
ITC versus federal district courts.112 After comparing patent
cases brought in both venues between 1972 and September
2006, a huge disparity in the outcomes became obvious. The
overall rate at which the ITC found infringement was 23%,
while infringement was only found in about 6% before district
courts.113 Hahn and Singer have speculated that this drastic
difference might be due to the fact that patent cases before the
district court often do not go to trial or that the ITC may hear
stronger patent cases than the district courts.114 Regardless of
potential reasoning, the relative success rates at the ITC are
shocking, and these statistics fully support the alleged bias for
patent holders in ITC cases.115
This vast discrepancy adds to the uncertainty and
unpredictability of patent law within the United States. If a
patent holder has four times the chance of succeeding before
the ITC, the traditional (and arguably sole) proper venue in
which to bring a patent infringement case—the federal district
courts—becomes far less appealing. This likelihood of success is
one of the many factors contributing to the rise in ITC
popularity, which is creating an increasingly large sector of
patent law that is being decided on an entirely different set of
standards and procedures.

111

Hahn & Singer, supra note 16.
Id. at 473.
113
Id. at 475.
114
Id. at 476.
115
Id. The Hahn and Singer study then explored the rates at which each
venue awards injunctive relief, finding that the ITC is again biased in favor of the
patent holders due to the heightened standard in district courts set forth in eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, Inc. Id. (examining eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006)). For further discussion, see infra Part V.B.3.
112
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Forum Shopping and Dual Litigation Lead to
Inefficiencies and the Potential for Conflicting Decisions

In addition to progressing away from protecting
domestic industry, trends also indicate that the ITC is being
treated as an alternate, and sometimes even simultaneous,
venue in which to try patent-infringement cases.116 The lack of
consistency between the proceedings and remedies allows
litigants to shop their claims, selecting the better of the two
venues in which to bring their complaints.117 This creation of
inconsistent patent law and the ability to take advantage of the
system was exactly what Congress was trying to prevent when
it created the consolidated and focused Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982.118 The increase in ITC patent cases is
therefore acting to reverse the congressional goal of promoting
predictable and consistent patent law within the United States.
Additionally, the ITC is not only being taken advantage of as
an alternate venue through forum shopping, but also as a
parallel venue in which to bring suit concurrent to a federal
court case.119 In a study conducted by Coleen Chien, 65% of
patent cases tried before the ITC between 1995 and mid-2007
had district-court counterparts.120 This absence of coordination
between the ITC and the U.S. court systems has many negative
effects. In addition to the ability to forum shop, the allowance
of parallel cases increases this harm by exposing litigants to
the risk of duplicative litigation and potentially conflicting
outcomes.121
E.

Preclusivity Not Given to ITC Decisions Results in
Judicial Waste

The problem of judicial waste and conflicting decisions
promoted by ITC practice is magnified by the fact that the
federal courts do not give preclusive effect to ITC
determinations. For example, the Delaware District Court’s
1989 opinion in In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser held that
the ITC’s decision that a patent was invalid should not
116

Chien, supra note 6, at 71. Simultaneous suits can be brought alleging the
same claims in both federal court and before the ITC. Id.
117
Id.
118
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 11.
119
Chien, supra note 6, at 92.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 71.

1110

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

preclude the district court from considering the patent’s
validity de novo.122 As later stated, “[the] district court can
attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decisions
that it considers justified.”123 This practice allows a party that
loses before the ITC based on patent invalidity to have a second
chance to succeed before a district court. The effect is to allow a
complainant to test the validity of his patent in the ITC forum
prior to bringing suit in the district courts, encouraging costly
and duplicative litigation.124
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

Due to all the potential issues surrounding patent cases
and the ITC, section 337 proceedings have created quite a
controversy. In order to right the path of patent law in the
United States, the only viable option is to abolish section 337
patent practice before the ITC. For the majority of this
country’s history, the federal courts have been the sole venue in
which patent cases can be tried, and this norm should be
reestablished. There is something to be learned, however, from
the ITC, and now is an ideal time to evaluate some of the
advantages ITC practice has demonstrated with the multitude
of proposals currently before Congress relating to patent law in
the United States. One such proposal is the Patent Pilot
Program—an amendment that would allow for more
specialization in the federal courts regarding patent cases.125
Much like the benefits that specialization offers the ITC,
numerous advantages in the federal courts can be realized.
This program should be initiated as a proper base upon which
additional modifications can be made. These further
amendments include the adoption of in rem jurisdiction for
cases relating to the importation of goods, as well as a per se
right to injunctive relief, attributes found to be quite beneficial
in the ITC forum.

122

721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989), appeal denied, 904 F.2d 44 (Fed. Cir.
1990), reh’g denied, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123
Tex. Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor, 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
124
Kopp, supra note 20, at 357.
125
Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192.
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Proposed Amendments Before Congress

Numerous proposals have been introduced to Congress
that have the potential to alter U.S. patent law in drastic ways.
These proposals include the Patent Pilot Program,126 as well as
the Patent Reform Act of 2010,127 both of which include
proposals that affect the heart of U.S. patent law but do not
directly address the ITC debate. Specifically, the Patent Pilot
Program proposes to direct patent cases to judges that choose
to hear them more often.128 This would be done by segregating
quasi-specialized patent trial judges from the general pool of
judges.129 District courts that participate in the Patent Pilot
Program would hear all the patent cases brought in their
district, creating in essence specialized patent trial courts.130
The ultimate goal was to create a more experienced and
specialized judicial presence before which patent cases can be
brought.131 For many of the same reasons that the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals was created as the sole jurisdiction to
bring appeals of patent cases, this specialization was proposed
to help make decisions in patent law cases more predictable,
more efficient, and most importantly, more accurate.132 The
theory is that the more patent cases a judge receives, the more
likely the judge will correctly decide the case and the more
efficient the entire process will become.133
The Patent Reform Act, in comparison to the Patent
Pilot Program, is a much more unwieldy and controversial
animal. This Act has been introduced in both the House and
Senate, and many of the elements mirror the proposed Patent
Reform legislation from years prior.134 Some of the more
consequential changes proposed include (1) a first-to-file
system, which gives priority of invention to the first to file an
application, rather than the applicant who first invented it; (2)
126

Id.
Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010, PANTENTLYO L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview.html.
128
Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192. The program was introduced by
Representative Darrell Issa under House Bill 34 in 2007. Id.
129
David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2009).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192.
133
Id.
134
Crouch, supra note 127.
127
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a change in the calculation of damages based on the invention’s
“specific contribution over the prior art”; (3) expanded
reexamination proceedings that can be initiated based on
published prior art or public use or sale in the United States
rather than just patents; (4) limiting the venues in which to
bring patent cases in attempts to limit bringing cases in
jurisdictions that favor patent holders, or cause undue
hardship for the defendants; and finally, (5) the abolishment of
interference practices.135 Some of the more controversial
sections were removed in comparison to the 2005 and 2007
Patent Reform Acts,136 but the list of proposed changes is still
quite impressive.
Although many of the proposals laid out in the Patent
Reform Act are of questionable value to the U.S. patent system,
the effects these changes may have are still very much
unknown.137 The Act’s scope is immense, and unlike the
proposals of the Patent Pilot Program, the issues at hand are
very deeply tied to international law and the United States’
obligation to honor various treaties and agreements with
foreign nations.138 There is continued debate before Congress
whether all, some, or none of these changes should be
implemented, and these debates will likely continue at length
as they have for many years.
B.

Suggested Approach

With all of the changes to patent law initiated by practice
before the ITC, and with the current amendments on the table
before Congress in the form of the Patent Reform Act and Patent
135

Id.
Mark P. Walters, Patent Reform 2009: It’s a “Threepeat,” WASH. STATE
PATENT L. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.wapatents.com/2009/03/patent-reform-2009
-its-threepeat.html. Some of the sections removed in the 2009 and 2010 proposals
include a requirement for quality submissions that mandates (1) an applicant research
whether a patent exists prior to filing, (2) an elimination of the equitable conduct
requirement, and (3) the granting of rule-making authority to the USPTO. Id.
137
Arguments have been made both in favor and against each of the
alterations outlined in the Patent Reform Act. See, e.g., Kelly C. McKinney, The Patent
Reform Act of 2007 and International Patent Law Harmonization, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
125 (2008). However, the discussion of these potential amendments and their effects is
beyond the scope of this note.
138
For example, the TRIPS Agreement, to which the United States is a
signatory, provides support for many of the Act’s amendments, and in general, many of
the other nations, who are also members of GATT and the WIPO, have more consistent
practices when it comes to patent laws in general (i.e., almost all have first to file
rather than first to invent systems). McKinney, supra note 137, at 132-43.
136
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Pilot Program, the direction of patent law in the United States
has become quite uncertain. Changes are needed to increase the
quality and efficiency of our system, and in order to jumpstart
these efforts, an intermediate and manageable solution needs to
be initiated. This note proposes that Congress adopt the Patent
Pilot Program’s specialized grouping of patent trial courts as a
harmonized and consolidated base, upon which needed
amendments to the patent system within the United States can
more easily be enacted. Along with this implementation,
immediate amendments also need to be adopted. Specifically,
some aspects of section 337 proceedings before the ITC must be
transferred to these specialized district patent courts, and to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. First, in order to protect one of
the only beneficial roles that the ITC does play, in rem
jurisdiction should be granted to these courts in cases involving
importation of allegedly infringing products. Second, the
injunctive powers of the ITC must also be transferred, in some
respects, to the federal courts through a congressional action to
amend the Patent Act to allow for a per se right to injunction.
1. Implement the Patent Pilot Program
Since the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1982, there has been much debate over whether the
goals of this endeavor have been met. With decisional
uniformity and the reduction of forum shopping as primary
objectives, most commentators agree that the Federal Circuit
has been a resounding success.139 The proposal for the Patent
Pilot Program was submitted in light of the Federal Circuit’s
success. Adoption of this proposal is the first key step toward
the harmonization of patent law in the United States.
The theory that having more experienced judges will
lead to efficiency, clarity, and uniformity seems obvious. Critics
are still not entirely persuaded, however, that the Patent Pilot
Program is an endeavor worth initiating.140 To combat this
uncertainty, Adam Shartzer performed an empirical study in
2009 in an attempt to predict the likely success of the
139

Shartzer, supra note 21, at 191; see also Richard Linn, The Future of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM.
U. L. REV. 731, 732, 737 (2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit quickly achieved
uniformity in patent law and that “the future in the patent area will be no different than
in the past in striving to bring uniformity, certainty, and clarity to the patent laws”).
140
For arguments against the Patent Pilot Program, see Schwartz, supra note
129, at 1701-02.
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program.141 His findings showed a direct correlation between
judges’ experience with patent cases and their affirmance rates
at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.142 This data strongly
supports the likelihood of the Patent Pilot Program’s success
and lends further support for its adoption.143
In addition to its likelihood of success in promoting better
decisions, one of the most important effects will be its ability to
consolidate the realm in which patent law is practiced. By
limiting the number of district courts in which patent cases are
commenced, amendments to patent law can be made more easily
and will be implemented more consistently. In addition, much
like the current ITC,144 these courts could be adapted to offer
high-tech facilities with features such as multimedia that
supports real-time reporting and graphic presentations.
2. Adopt In Rem Jurisdiction for Cases Relating to the
Importation of Allegedly Infringing Goods
One of the principal benefits of litigating patent cases
before the ITC is its broad in rem jurisdiction.145 Without the
requirement of establishing personal jurisdiction over the
alleged infringing party, suits could be brought earlier in the
process—specifically, before the alleged infringing product is
sold or offered for sale within the United States.146 Jurisdiction
is derived from the imported articles, not the presence of the
parties or unfair acts in the vicinity of the forum.147 The benefits
in rem jurisdiction offer are massive, and this solution should
be implemented in the federal courts when dealing with patent
cases relating to importation.
In addition, in rem jurisdiction offers the opportunity to
address infringement by multiple products and by multiple

141

Shartzer, supra note 21, at 193.
Id. at 231-33.
143
Shartzer’s study was based on comparing patent-case outcomes from the
top fifteen patent districts in terms of patent-case filings, and compares the number of
times a judge has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in relation to
the number of times that particular judge had his cases reviewed by the Federal
Circuit. A total of 616 cases were analyzed, and a direct correlation was found,
indicating that affirmance rates improve as district judges have more of their cases
appealed and reviewed by the Federal Circuit. See id. at 226-27.
144
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6.
145
Id. at 3-4.
146
See id. at 4.
147
Id.
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parties in a single forum.148 One of the biggest drawbacks to
patent cases in federal court, and one of the main reasons that
the ITC has become so popular, is the difficulty arising from
jurisdiction and service issues.149 Fighting over these issues,
especially when a multinational or foreign company is involved,
requires exorbitant amounts of time and money to resolve.150
With the adoption of in rem jurisdiction, these problems all but
disappear.
The international community’s concern regarding the
current ITC practices seems likely to pertain to this in rem
jurisdiction right if granted to the federal courts. This concern,
however, is unfounded. The “national treatment” commitment
to treat all parties alike will be maintained if this jurisdictional
right is granted properly, and many of the major concerns the
international community had with patent practice before the
ITC would be eliminated. For example, foreign respondents
would no longer face dual litigation in the ITC and federal
courts, discriminatory time limits that favor local residents, or
broad forum-selection rules that favor complainants.151 With the
exception of the liberal general exclusion orders (discussed
below with the proposed standard for injunctive relief), all the
concerns of the international community will no longer be at
issue. With the abolition of the ITC and the adoption of the
Patent Pilot Program, the concerns of forum shopping and dual
litigation cease to exist.
3. Adopt a Per Se Right to Injunctive Relief in Federal
Court Patent Cases
The availability of injunctive relief is one of the major
values highlighted by ITC patent practice. This remedy is one
of the major reasons that practice in this forum has become so
popular in recent years, especially in light of the heightened
bar set in the federal courts by the eBay decision.152 The
question raised is whether the lowered standards available at
the ITC would offer benefits to the traditional U.S. patent
system. It is important to note that just because something is
popular or preferred does not make it more likely to be
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Id.
Krupka, supra note 17, at 730.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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beneficial to the system as a whole, and in some cases,
popularity could be seen as a sign of an unfair advantage.
However, before coming to a conclusion, we must first analyze
the effect the eBay decision has on the state of injunctive relief
in federal courts, as well as the social and economic effects of
injunctive relief on the patent system, the economy, and
technological development as a whole.
Prior to the eBay case, the Federal Circuit had granted
injunctive relief for infringement of a patent almost as a matter
of course.153 However, in eBay, the Supreme Court overturned a
long line of federal cases following this general propensity to
award an injunction.154 Justice Thomas, in the majority opinion,
laid out a four-factor test that must be satisfied in order to
justify the granting of injunctive relief:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved buy a permanent injunction.155

The majority held that the issuance of permanent injunctions
would be decided on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of
these factors in order to maintain the “well-established
principles of equity.”156 A survey of the district courts’
interpretation of the decision, however, yielded a consensus
that the majority of courts are applying Justice Kennedy’s
approach laid out in his concurring opinion, in which a threetiered categorization of patent holders’ rights is defined.157
These categories separate patent holders into patentees that
participate in the manufacture and sales of patented products
and methods, research and nonprofit institutions that produce
patentable
inventions,
and
inventors
that
pursue
commercialization of the patented inventions by licensing.158
153

Dariush Keyhani, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 6 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2008); see also W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275,
1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[A]n injunction should issue once infringement has been
established unless there is sufficient reason for denying it.”).
154
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
155
Id. at 391.
156
Id.
157
Keyhani, supra note 153, at 2; see also Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 543 (2008).
158
eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97.
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When categorized, the district courts more liberally granted
injunctive relief to the first two groups and failed to award
injunctive relief in almost all cases involving this third group.159
This denial of injunctive relief is inherently inequitable to
those parties who choose to take advantage of their procured
patent rights in certain ways, and some critics argue it is a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.160
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”161 Advocates in support of
injunctive relief argue that denying this remedy where a patent
is found to be infringed is inconsistent with the patent holder’s
right to due process of law and thus violates this clause.162 The
idea is that the government essentially grants the patent
holder an exclusive property right when the patent is issued,
and although this right is an intellectual-property right, it
should be treated no differently from rights assigned to
personal or real property.163 When the courts find that this
property right has been violated, in this case when the patent
has been infringed, this property right must be recognized, and
the patent owner is deserving of absolute injunctive relief. The
government’s imposition of unexpected limitations on this
right, as in the case of allowing further future infringement, is
in essence a “de facto private eminent domain sanctioned by
the government.”164
In addition to conflicts with the U.S. Constitution,
failure to reward injunctive relief may run astray of
commitments to international intellectual-property agreements
as well. These agreements include the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement under
GATT.165 TRIPS was signed and put into effect in the mid1990s, committing the United States, as well as all other
signatories, to its multitude of requirements. One of the
159

Keyhani, supra note 153, at 2. In 2008, Keyhani researched cases involving
this third group—inventors who pursue commercialization of the patented inventions
by licensing—in an analysis of the effects of the eBay decision.
160
Id. at 4.
161
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
162
Keyhani, supra note 153, at 4 (citing Paul M. Schoenhard, Who Took My
IP—Defending the Availability of Injunctive Relief of Patent Owners, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 187, 193 (2008)).
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Id.
164
Id.
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Id. at 5-6.
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limitations outlined in Article 30 states, “Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”166 The
denial of an injunction to a patent holder whose patent was
found to be infringed is a denial of the right to exclude and is a
forced compulsory license.167 The right to exclude and the right
to choose how one wishes to commercialize one’ patent is part
of the normal exploitation of a patent.168 Forcing the patent
holder to license the rights to an infringing party prejudices the
legitimate interest of the patent holder, and critics argue this
requirement violates the United States’ obligation under the
TRIPS agreement.169
Finally, and most importantly, limiting the award of
injunctive relief is bad economic policy. Injunctive relief
strengthens the patent system, and reinforces the incentives to
invent and have these inventions patented. When injunctive
relief is no longer awarded, or is awarded in a more limited
fashion, it has the effect of undermining both innovation and
entrepreneurship. With the expansive globalization in the past
decades that has opened up vast numbers of lower-cost
markets, what we once were able to manufacture and sell in
the United States can no longer be manufactured here, at least
not competitively. One of the last frontiers in which the United
States and other highly developed countries thrive is
innovation and technology. With the weakening of intellectualproperty rights the lack of a per se right to an injunction, we
are effectively weakening the United States’ last economic edge
in the global marketplace.170 With the current standard for
injunctive relief, patent holders are being unjustly treated. The
only solution available is congressional action to amend the
Patent Act to undo the harm created by the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay and to allow for a per se right to injunctive
relief.
166

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 30
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
167
Keyhani, supra note 153, at 6.
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CONCLUSION

The ITC’s section 337 proceedings involving patent
disputes must be abolished. The large number of
inconsistencies between patent suits before the ITC and those
in federal court has created a variety of problems that must be
remedied before the divergent path of patent law in the United
States can be righted. These issues include the trending of ITC
cases away from the venue’s initial purpose of offering
protection against foreign industries171 and concerns with
respect to compliance with international law.172 Furthermore,
studies show that proceedings before the ITC improperly favor
patent holders,173 promote inefficiencies in the patent system,174
and lead to judicial waste.175
Some aspects of section 337 proceedings have been
shown to be quite advantageous, however, and amendments
should be made to the patent system currently in place to take
advantage of the lessons learned. These amendments include
the granting of in rem jurisdiction to the federal courts when
addressing cases involving importation of allegedly infringing
products and a congressional action to amend the Patent Act to
allow for a per se right to an injunction. In addition, Congress
should adopt the proposed Patent Pilot Program, which would
create a more specialized district-court system in which to hear
patent cases176 and offer a united base upon which further
amendments can be more easily implemented.
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